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[1047] 
Contractual Indescendibility 
David Horton* 
Testation is supposed to be comprehensive: when we die, we pass everything we own to 
our friends and family. However, a growing number of valuable things defy this 
principle. From frequent flyer miles to virtual property to e-mail and social media 
accounts, some assets expressly state that they cannot be transmitted by will, trust, or 
intestacy. This invited contribution to the Hastings Law Journal Symposium in honor of 
Charles L. Knapp analyzes this trend, which I call “contractual indescendibility.” It 
shows that consumers who challenge noninheritability provisions face three obstacles. 
First, they have to prove an ownership interest in the item. Second, they need to invalidate 
the indescendibility clause under contract law. And third, they must navigate the gauntlet 
of federal legislation that governs this area. Despite these hurdles, I conclude that 
companies should not have carte blanche to delete this cherished stick from the bundle of 
rights. 
 
 * Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law (King Hall). 
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Introduction 
 Like many professionals, Ken Means, an engineer from Texas, 
spends too much time on the road.1 He has accumulated 650,000 frequent 
flyer miles and hotel rewards points.2 Thus, when Ken made a will, he 
treated his loyalty credits like everything else that belonged to him, and 
left them to his wife.3 Yet Ken probably attempted to exercise a property 
right that does not exist. Buried in the terms and conditions of Ken’s 
memberships is likely a clause that makes his points indescendible—
nontransferable by will, trust, or intestacy. 
This phenomenon, which I call “contractual indescendibility,” is 
quietly becoming a flashpoint in the adhesion contract war.4 It is the 
product of several different trends. The first is the rise of assets that 
straddle the border between contract and property. Americans place an 
increasing amount of pecuniary and psychological value on frequent flyer 
 
 1. See Gary Stoller, What Happens to Frequent-Flier Miles If You Die?, U.S.A. Today (Sept. 1, 
2013, 6:03 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/2013/09/01/deceased-travelers-frequent-
flyer-points/2749761. 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. For an anecdotal account of an estate planner who directs clients to address frequent flyer 
miles in their wills, see Susan Stellin, The Afterlife of Your Frequent Flier Miles, N.Y. Times (Nov. 21, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/travel/the-afterlife-of-your-frequent-flier-miles.html. 
 4. I briefly address contractual indescendibility in David Horton, Indescendibility, 102 Calif. L. 
Rev. 543, 56570, 59799 (2014). This Article expands on my analysis there. In addition, for a similar 
piece that appeared while this Article was in the editing stage, see generally Natalie M. Banta, Inherit 
the Cloud: The Role of Private Contracts in Distributing or Deleting Digital Assets at Death, 
83 Fordham L. Rev. 799 (2014). 
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miles, video game winnings, e-mails, and uploads to social media accounts.5 
For example, a 2011 survey of the United States found over two billion 
rewards program members holding $48 billion in points.6 Similarly, 
security software vendor McAfee recently estimated that consumers 
have amassed an average of $55,000 in digital assets,7 and the gross 
domestic product of virtual universe Second Life is roughly $600 million, 
which places it among the top twenty-five nations in the world.8 The 
companies that create this newest of “new property” are taking pains to 
liberate themselves from the cost and hassle of complying with their 
customers’ testamentary wishes.9 
Contractual indescendibility also reflects the creeping privatization 
of inheritance. Once, estate planning meant executing a will, a single 
instrument that passed through probate and disposed of all of a 
decedent’s possessions. Today, most middle and upper class individuals 
attempt to avoid court-based succession by using contract-like devices. 
Indeed, they hold vast reservoirs of wealth in pensions, life insurance, 
 
 5. The ascent of frequent flyer miles and their ilk is a minor part of much larger changes in the 
nature of the economy. Land, once the fount of social power, has been eclipsed by paper assets such as 
stocks, bonds, and mutual funds. See John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of 
the Law of Succession, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1108, 1119 (1984). 
 6. See Tim Winship, Airline Frequent Flyer Miles, 30 Years Later, ABC News (May 25, 2011), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Travel/airline-frequent-flyer-miles-30- years/story?id=13616082. 
 7. McAfee Reveals Average Internet User Has More than $37,000 in Unprotected ‘Digital Assets’, 
McAfee (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.mcafee.com/us/about/news/2011/q3/20110927-01.aspx. McAfee, 
which sells security software to protect these supposedly cherished digital assets, stands to gain from 
making this figure as high as possible. Id. 
 8. See Peter Diamandis, Second Life: How a Virtual World Became a Reality, Huffington Post 
(Mar. 7, 2013, 3:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-diamandis/second-life-how-a-virtual_b_ 
2831270.html; see also GDP (Current U.S. $), World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited May 10, 2015). 
 9. Sports franchises also make season tickets partially indescendibile: transferable only to certain 
people, or for a fee. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 4, at 566; Rachael Rustmann, It’s a Brand New 
Ballgame: How to Bequest Season Tickets for Your Favorite Sports Team’s Games, 4 Est. Plan. & 
Community Prop. L.J. 369, 37375 (2012). For instance, the Green Bay Packers have an elaborate 
scheme of preapproved relatives who can inherit season tickets: 
We will honor a request for transfer as follows:  
  a) Upon death of ticket holder  
1) To surviving spouse; or if no spouse, the surviving children of a deceased ticket 
holder without authorization. (If children do not agree—no transfer.)  
2) If direction by deceased under will or specific writing to family devisees defined in 
(b) but not to devisees who are not defined in (b), even with direction.  
  b) To family, defined as, spouse and “blood” relatives who are not more than first 
cousins, on direction of ticket holder in writing during his or her life-time. (Excludes, for 
example, transfer to friends.) 
Season Tickets, Green Bay Packers, http://www.packers.com/tickets/season-tickets.html (last visited 
May 10, 2015); see also Associated Press, Brother Sues Brother Over Packers Tickets, Milwaukee-Wis. 
J. Sentinel (May 27, 2009), http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/46286532.html (describing one father’s 
ill-fated attempt to pass the right to sell his Packers season tickets to his sons). In the interest of 
brevity, I will not discuss personal seat licenses in this Article. 
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and pay-on-death accounts.10 These nonprobate mechanisms allow owners 
to name beneficiaries by filling out a form. Contractual indescendibility 
is the inverse of this movement, the recognition that, just as private 
agreement can facilitate testation, it can deny the right to engage in 
testation altogether. 
Finally, contractual indescendibility reflects the insatiable ambition 
of fine print—a fact that makes it a suitable topic for this invited 
symposium contribution to the Hastings Law Journal in honor of Charles 
L. Knapp’s fiftieth year of teaching. During his storied career, Chuck has 
chronicled how large companies have used adhesive terms to disclaim 
warranties, limit their liability, and shunt consumers’ and employees’ claims 
into distant forums or binding arbitration (or both).11 Of course, the case 
law and commentary on contractual indescendibility will never reach the 
epic proportions of the debates to which Chuck has added his resonant 
voice. Yet the boilerplate contract that deletes the right to bequeath or 
transmit through intestacy is a symptom of the same pathology. As Chuck 
has lucidly explained, modern contract law rewards drafters and privileges 
an instrument’s text.12 In light of these incentives, it is not surprising that 
firms are testing the waters with novel self-serving schemes. 
Admittedly, contractual indescendibility will seem unproblematic to 
some readers. For starters, loyalty points, virtual property, and digital 
media may not even belong to consumers. Unlike land or chattels, these 
things exist only because an airline, hotel, rental car agency, credit card 
issuer, video game developer, or internet service provider (“ISP”) has 
constructed them. Arguably, drafters should be free to exclude particular 
stalks from their artificial bouquets of rights. Moreover, the market may 
constrain firms. For instance, Yahoo! does not allow the contents of e-
mail accounts to be inherited,13 but Google will sometimes accommodate 
a decedent’s wishes.14 If consumers care about bequeathing their electronic 
 
 10. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Major Reforms of the Property Restatement and the Uniform Probate 
Code: Reformation, Harmless Error, and Nonprobate Transfers, 38 ACTEC L.J. 1, 12 (2012) (noting 
the prevalence of “financially intermediated account forms that invite nonprobate transfer”). 
 11. See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Cases and Controversies: Some Things to Do with Contracts Cases, 
88 Wash. L. Rev. 1357, 1393 (2013); Charles L. Knapp, Contract Law Walks the Plank: Carnival Cruise 
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 12 Nev. L.J. 553, 561 (2012); Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet 
Revolution in Contract Law, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 761, 766 (2002); Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or 
Copping Out? An Argument for Strict Scrutiny of Individual Contracts, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 95, 110 
(2006) [hereinafter Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out?]; Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on 
Mandatory Arbitration: Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46 San Diego L. Rev. 609, 627 (2009). 
 12. See, e.g., Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out?, supra note 11, at 100–03. 
 13. See Yahoo! Terms of Service, Yahoo!, https://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/terms/ (last 
visited May 10, 2015) (“You agree that your Yahoo account is non-transferable and any rights to your 
Yahoo ID or contents within your account terminate upon your death.”). 
 14. See Submit a Request Regarding a Deceased User’s Account, Google, https://support.google.com/ 
accounts/answer/2842525?hl=en&ref_topic=3075532 (last visited May 10, 2015) (setting forth a procedure 
for authorized representatives of a deceased user to obtain contents of a deceased user’s account). 
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correspondence, perhaps they will vote with their feet and patronize pro-
descendibility firms. Finally, some businesses can claim that Congress has 
given its imprimatur to their indescendibility policies. The Airline 
Deregulation Act (“ADA”) grants carriers broad leeway to structure 
their affairs without interference from state consumer protection 
efforts.15 Similarly, the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) bars ISPs 
from disclosing a customer’s private digital communications without her 
consent.16 Although the SCA’s precise effect on inheritance issues 
remains hazy,17 some ISPs have argued that it prevents them from 
allowing a fiduciary to marshal a decedent’s online assets.18 These are all 
plausible arguments that indescendibility clauses should be enforceable. 
Nevertheless, I am more skeptical about these provisions. First, I 
explain why consumers should not need to prove that rewards points, 
avatars, and e-mails are their “property” for all purposes. Instead, the 
benchmark ought to be the narrower issue of whether these things are 
descendible. Judges can answer this question by examining whether a 
company has given its customers reason to believe that their rights are 
transferable. Second, not every indescendibility clause should be valid as 
a matter of black-letter contract law. For one, some firms will be unable 
to prove that consumers manifested assent to the fine print. In addition, 
courts may strike down noninheritability provisions under either the 
unconscionability doctrine or the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Third, although the ADA is a formidable obstacle for frequent 
flyers who wish to challenge indescendibility clauses, the SCA leaves 
room for pro-consumer state regulation. 
This Article contains two Parts. Part I provides a brief overview of 
the rising number of assets that purport to be indescendible. Part II 
examines the tripartite legal showing that a consumer must make to 
overcome a noninheritability provision: that (1) she has an ownership 
interest in the item, (2) the indescendibility clause is not enforceable, and 
(3) federal law does not shield the provision. 
I.  Contractual Indescendibility 
Two ideas about inheritance are rarely questioned. The first is that 
to acquire something is also to enjoy the privilege to convey it after 
death. Indeed, “[i]t is hard for most Americans to imagine a system of 
private property that doesn’t include a right to control what happens to their 
 
 15. See 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2015) (barring states from regulating certain aspects of air travel). 
 16. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2015). 
 17. Compare Naomi Cahn, Probate Law Meets the Digital Age, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1697, 1716–17 (2014) 
(arguing that courts can construe the SCA not to preclude fiduciary access to digital assets), with David 
Horton, The Stored Communications Act and Digital Assets, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1729, 1735–36 (2014) (reading 
the SCA to permit access only if a user has taken affirmative steps during life to authorize disclosure). 
 18. See infra Part II.C.2. 
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property after death.”19 The second is that succession is all-encompassing.20 
Professionally drafted wills and trusts have a residuary clause, which 
transmits any item not specifically mentioned to particular beneficiaries. 
And even if a decedent omits an asset from her estate plan, the intestacy 
scheme will shepherd it to her heirs. Thus, when someone dies, all that is 
hers—“every jewel and bauble, every bank account, all stocks and bonds, 
the cars and houses, corn futures or gold bullion, all books, CD’s, pictures, 
and carpets—everything will pass on to somebody or something else.”21 
But as this Part demonstrates, some valuable things defy these basic 
propositions.22 Indeed, companies often exploit their dominion over the 
fine print to make items indescendible. 
A. Frequent Flyer Miles and Loyalty Points 
In 1922, Roscoe Pound noted that paper assets like stocks were 
becoming the centerpiece of the economy by declaring that “[w]ealth, in 
a commercial age, is made up largely of promises.”23 Today, one might 
jest that wealth consists mainly of frequent flyer miles. This Subpart 
reveals that the wild popularity of rewards points has spurred many firms 
to make them noninheritable. 
The first loyalty programs were relatively simple. In the 1970s, 
banks had enjoyed success with gimmicks such as giving toasters to their 
best clients.24 In May 1981, American Airlines borrowed that model with 
its AAdvantage initiative.25 The carrier informed its 190,000 most active 
flyers that they were entitled to discounted tickets and seat upgrades.26 
Only six days later, cutthroat competitor United Airlines unveiled a similar 
plan, Mileage Plus.27 Within a few years, primitive loyalty programs had 
sprung up throughout the transportation industry.28 Yet despite their 
 
 19. Ray D. Madoff, Immortality and the Law 57–58 (2010). 
 20. Adam J. Hirsch, Incomplete Wills, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 1423, 1424 (2013) (“One way or another, 
everything previously owned by a deceased person is going to pass into someone else’s hands.”). 
 21. Lawrence M. Friedman, Dead Hands: A Social History of Wills, Trusts, and Inheritance 
Law 3 (2009). 
 22. Another species of indescendibility might be thought of as “pure indescendibility,” things that 
are impervious to posthumous transfer even though no contract covers them. See Horton, supra note 
4, at 548–65 (discussing noble titles, body parts, and certain causes of action). 
 23. Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 225 (1922). 
 24. See, e.g., The Big 2-5Celebrating 25 Years of Frequent Flyer Programs, InsideFlyer, 
http://www.insideflyer.com/articles/article.php?key=2926 (last visited May 10, 2015) [hereinafter The Big 2-5]. 
 25. See, e.g., History of AMR Corporation and American Airlines, American Airlines, 
https://www.aa.com/i18n/amrcorp/corporateInformation/facts/history.jsp (last visited May 10, 2015). 
 26. See, e.g., The Big 2-5, supra note 24. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See, e.g., History of Loyalty Programs, FrequentFlier.com, http://www.frequentflier.com/ 
programs/history-of-loyalty-programs (last visited May 10, 2015) (noting that Delta and TWA christened 
frequent flyer programs in 1981, Holiday Inn and Marriott adopted rewards policies in 1983, and National 
Rental Car joined the fray in 1987). 
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ubiquity, rewards points were little more than glorified coupons. Customers 
earned miles and their ilk by travelling, booking a hotel room, or renting 
a car.29 They could only redeem credits in similar transactions with the 
same firm, and they could not transfer points under any circumstances.30 
But as the decades passed, rewards points mutated into a shadowy 
form of wealth. Airlines, hotels, and car rental agencies forged alliances 
with non-travel-related entities, such as credit card issuers and phone 
companies.31 Thus, points became the valuable residue of engaging in 
commercial activity—a kind of interest that accrues from structuring 
one’s finances the right way. Indeed, roughly half of the 14 trillion 
frequent flyer miles in circulation32 have been earned without setting foot 
on a plane.33 The most vociferous consumer of Delta SkyMiles is 
American Express, which uses them to incentivize its own products.34 
Likewise, American Airlines sells AAdvantage points to over a thousand 
other corporations, meaning that consumers “earn miles for everything 
from home mortgages to Lasik surgery to buying Gap jeans online.”35 In 
addition, the purchasing power of points expanded dramatically. Rather 
than merely being able to trade credits for a companion ticket or an extra 
day at a destination, members began to enjoy the power to donate to 
charities and buy steaks, electronics, and tickets to Broadway shows.36 
For these reasons, a 2002 article in The Economist proclaimed that 
rewards points were the world’s second largest currency, behind only the 
dollar.37 As one commentator quipped, “[a]irlines don’t exist” because 
they have been replaced by “loyalty compan[ies].”38 
To capitalize on the points craze, some firms have abandoned their 
nontransferability policies. Alaska, American, Delta, Continental, 
Northwest, U.S. Airways, and United allow their frequent flyers to 
 
 29. See, e.g., The Big 2-5, supra note 24. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See, e.g., Northwest Joins with MCI in Frequent-Flier Venture, Associated Press, June 14, 1988, 
available at http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1988/Northwest-Joins-With-MCI-In-Frequent-Flyer-Venture/ 
id-95c07f6776a7ace810589a97c25bb01b. 
 32. See Andrew Clark, Frequent Flyer Miles Soar Above Sterling, Guardian (Jan. 7, 2005, 
10:51 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/money/2005/jan/08/business.theairlineindustry. 
 33. Airline Miles: Frequent-Flyer Economics, Economist (May 2, 2002), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/1109840. 
 34. See Ron Lieber, Now May Be a Good Time to Bail Out of Frequent-Flier Programs, N.Y. 
Times (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/01/your-money/credit-and-debit-cards/now-may-be-
a-good-time-to-bail-out-of-frequent-flier-programs.html. 
 35. See Winship, supra note 6. In 2013, airlines sold nearly $20 billion in miles to “program partners.” 
Christopher Elliott, Don’t Panic, But There Are No More Airlines, LinkedIn (Jan. 19, 2014), 
https://www.linkedin.com/today/post/article/20140119192325-332179-don-t-panic-but-there-are-no-
more-airlines. 
 36. See Brief for California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 18, Nw., Inc. v. 
Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422 (2014) (No. 12-462). 
 37. See Airline Miles: Frequent-Flyer Economics, supra note 33. 
 38. Elliott, supra note 35. 
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convey miles to each other for a fee.39 Similarly, on websites such as 
Points.com, members can exchange points for PayPal credits and then 
convert them into cash.40 In fact, as technology evolves, members may 
soon be able to pay with points “anywhere they can use a credit card.”41 
Yet despite the porous boundary between miles and money, many 
companies deny customers the ability to convey their earnings after 
death.42 For instance, Alaska and United declare in their program terms 
and conditions that points are not a member’s “property.”43 Although 
this language does not expressly make points noninheritable, it achieves 
that goal indirectly: decedents cannot transfer what they do not own.44 
Other companies are more forthright. For example, JetBlue states that 
miles “are non-transferable . . . upon death.”45 Similarly, Hyatt covers 
both bases by providing that “[a]ccrued points do not constitute property 
of the [m]ember . . . and are not transferable to another person for any 
reason including . . . inheritance.”46 And Delta recently made headlines 
by changing its descendibility policy. Previously, the carrier allowed 
 
 39. See Ed Perkins, Can I Transfer My Frequent Flyer Miles?, SmarterTravel (Oct. 13, 2008), 
http://www.smartertravel.com/travel-advice/can-transfer-my-frequent-flyer-miles.html?id=2678619. 
 40. Jane Genova, Frequent Flyer Miles: Perils of Unregulated Currencies, Payment Week (Apr. 21, 
2014), http://paymentweek.com/2014-4-21-frequent-flyer-miles-perils-unregulated-currencies-33185. 
 41. Miles as Money, InsideFlyer, http://www.insideflyer.com/articles/article.php?key=8246 (last 
visited May 10, 2015). 
 42. Some firms prohibit both lifetime and posthumous transfer. See, e.g., Terms and Conditions, 
Sw. Airlines, http://www.southwest.com/html/customerservice/faqs.html?topic=rapid_rewards_program_ 
terms_and_conditions (last visited May 10, 2015). 
 43. See Conditions of Membership, Alaska Airlines, http://www.alaskaair.com/content/mileage-
plan/benefits/conditions-of-membership.aspx#transfers (last visited May 10, 2015); MileagePlus Rules, 
United Airlines, http://www.united.com/web/en-US/content/mileageplus/rules/default.aspx (last visited 
May 10, 2015). These “not property” provisions are also common among companies that do not permit 
members to transfer points during life. See, e.g., About Membership Rewards, Am. Express, 
https://catalogue.membershiprewards.com.sg/aboutTerms.mtw (last visited May 10, 2015); HHonors 
Terms & Conditions, Hilton, http://hhonors3.hilton.com/en/terms/index.html (last visited May 10, 2015). 
 44. As I discuss in greater depth in Horton, supra note 4, at 57681, this “not property” rationale 
also looms large in the context of pure indescendibility. For instance, courts have made cadaveric 
organs indescendible by deeming them not to be a decedent’s property. See, e.g., Estate of Jimenez, 
65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 710, 714 (Ct. App. 1997). On the flip side, many jurisdictions deem the right of publicity 
to be inheritable because it is a “species of intangible personal property.” State ex rel. Elvis Presley 
Int’l Mem’l Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). 
 45. TrueBlue Terms and Conditions, JetBlue, https://trueblue.jetblue.com/web/trueblue/terms-
and-conditions (last visited May 10, 2015). 
 46. Hyatt Gold Passport Terms & Conditions, Hyatt, http://www.hyatt.com/hyatt/customer-service/ 
gp-terms-conditions.jsp (last visited May 10, 2015). American Airlines’ terms are similar, but also 
grant the carrier the ability to make exceptions to its general stance of noninheritability: 
Neither accrued mileage, nor award tickets, nor upgrades are transferable by the member 
(i) upon death . . . . However, American Airlines, in its sole discretion, may credit accrued 
mileage to persons specifically identified in court approved . . . wills upon receipt of 
documentation satisfactory to American Airlines and upon payment of any applicable fees. 
General AAdvantage Program Conditions, Am. Airlines, http://www.aa.com/i18n/AAdvantage/ 
programInformation/termsConditions.jsp (last visited May 10, 2015). 
Horton_16 (EGK) (1) 5/21/2015 12:05 AM 
May 2015]          CONTRACTUAL INDESCENDIBILITY 1055 
SkyMiles to be inherited or willed.47 But in March 2013, Delta added the 
following clause to the litany of reasons it can delete an account: “A 
member is deceased.”48 
In sum, loyalty points have evolved from publicity stunts to possessions 
that are “worth real money.”49 Along the way, they have become freely 
transferable and yet increasingly noninheritable. And as I discuss next, a 
similar pattern is emerging in the area of electronic possessions. 
B. Virtual Assets 
Another nascent form of wealth comes in the form of items won, built, 
or purchased in video games. Massively multiplayer online role-playing 
games (“MMORPG”) and virtual worlds are popular, in part, because 
they offer participants “incremental rewards” to make them feel as if 
“they are progressing and becoming more capable.”50 To climb this 
ladder, players compete for items, coins, or powers. Again, though, many 
of these scarce resources are indescendible. 
The MMORPG World of Warcraft (“WoW”) illustrates the 
property-like traits of virtual possessions.51 Players build up their 
avatars—a process known as “leveling”—by “questing” (finishing tasks, 
such as killing a boss or finding a hidden item) and “grinding” (defeating 
as many enemies as possible).52 Accordingly, a seasoned avatar is a 
substantial investment: it takes roughly nineteen days of uninterrupted 
play to “level” a WoW character from one to sixty.53 Likewise, WoW 
features a “robust, eBay-like in-game auction house system” in which 
 
 47. Scott McCartney, When You Expire, So Do Your Delta Miles, Wall St. J. (Apr. 17, 2013, 10:00 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/middleseat/2013/04/17/delta-air-lines-skymiles-when-you-expire-so-do-your-miles. 
 48. SkyMiles Rules & Conditions, Delta Airlines, http://www.delta.com/content/www/en_US/ 
skymiles/about-skymiles/program-rules-conditions.html (last visited May 10, 2015). Delta also clarified 
that SkyMiles “are not the property of any member” and “may not be . . . pledged, or transferred 
under any circumstances, including, without limitation, by operation of law, upon death, or in 
connection with any domestic relations dispute and/or legal proceeding.” Id. 
 49. Stoller, supra note 1. 
 50. Seth Schiesel, Conquering the Burning Crusade, N.Y. Times (Jan. 31, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/arts/warcraft-journal.html. 
 51. WoW boasts over 100 million accounts worldwide. See Olivia Grace, 100,000,000 World of 
Warcraft Accounts Infographic, WoW Insider (Jan. 28, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://wow.joystiq.com/ 
2014/01/28/100-000-000-world-of-warcraft-accounts-infographic. Other popular MMORPGs include 
EverQuest, Final Fantasy, Legend of Mir, and Lineage. See generally Tyler T. Ochoa, Who Owns an 
Avatar? Copyright, Creativity, and Virtual Worlds, 14 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 959, 960 (2012) (noting 
that MMORPGs earned $2.7 billion in North America and Europe in 2010). 
 52. See Brett Burns, Comment, Level 85 Rogue: When Virtual Theft Merits Criminal Penalties, 80 
UMKC L. Rev. 831, 832 n.11 (2012). 
 53. See Jennifer Miller, Comment, The Battle Over “Bots”: Anti-Circumvention, the DMCA, and 
“Cheating” at World of Warcraft, 80 U. Cin. L. Rev. 653, 654 (2011). An avatar’s “level” refers to her 
“overall effectiveness, power, usefulness, [and] strength . . . .” Level, WowWiki, http://www.wowwiki.com/ 
Level (last visited May 10, 2015). 
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players can trade gold for combat gear, medicine, and other tools.54 
Outside of the game, WoW’s creator, Blizzard Entertainment, strictly 
forbids trade in virtual goods.55 However, there is a thriving black 
market.56 For instance, a level seventy character reportedly sold for 
$10,000.57 Similarly, Chinese jail guards reportedly forced prisoners to 
engage in virtual manual labor by “gold farming” within WoW, performing 
repetitive tasks to earn virtual currency.58 Nevertheless, despite the 
blurred line between digital and real money, Blizzard extends its anti-
transfer policy to decedents, dictating that players “have no ownership or 
other property interest in any account.”59 
Unscripted simulations such as the City of Heroes, Entropia 
Universe, The Sims, and Second Life feature an even starker example of 
contractual indescendibility. Unlike WoW, where buying gold or weapons 
is an illicit shortcut in a “hero’s journey,”60 these virtual worlds follow no 
predetermined plot and therefore have no need to bar out-of-game sales. 
To the contrary, they encourage players to invest real money in digital 
goods. For example, Second Life permits users to design, construct, and 
sell a range of items, including clothes, avatar skins, and “sex beds.”61 
Linden Labs, which runs Second Life, has adopted its own currency (the 
Linden) and created an exchange (the LindeX) where consumers can 
swap tangible dollars for their electronic counterpart (or vice versa).62 
Players engage in over a million transactions per day, and have transferred 
a total of $3.2 billion in virtual assets.63 In fact, some people actually 
 
 54. Schiesel, supra note 50. 
 55. World of Warcraft Terms of Use, Blizzard Entm’t, http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/ 
legal/wow_tou.html (last updated Aug. 22, 2012). 
 56. This is true of MMORPGs generally. See Theodore J. Westbrook, Owned: Finding a Place for 
Virtual World Property Rights, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 779, 786 (2006). 
 57. See Charles Phelps, More Inheritable Rights for Digital Assets, 41 Rutgers L. Rec. 131, 137 (2014). 
 58. See Paul Tassi, Chinese Prisoners Forced to Farm World of Warcraft Gold, Forbes (June 2, 
2011, 9:06 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2011/06/02/chinese-prisoners-forced-to-farm-
world-of-warcraft-gold. 
 59. World of Warcraft Terms of Use, supra note 55. 
 60. See Leandra Lederman, “Stranger Than Fiction”: Taxing Virtual Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1620, 1628 (2007). 
 61. Juliet M. Moringiello, What Virtual Worlds Can Do for Property Law, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 159, 165 (2010). 
 62. See Buying and Selling Linden Dollars, Second Life, http://community.secondlife.com/ 
t5/English-Knowledge-Base/Buying-and-selling-Linden-dollars/ta-p/700107 (last updated Aug. 6, 2012). 
Linden also trumpets the fact that it “grant[s] its users intellectual property rights over all items and 
structures created by them.” Ben Quarmby, Pirates Among the Second Life Islands—Why You Should 
Monitor the Misuse of Your Intellectual Property in Online Virtual Worlds, 26 Cardozo Arts & Ent. 
L.J. 667, 670 (2009). 
 63. See Jef Reahard, Second Life Readies for 10th Anniversary, Celebrates a Million Active Users Per 
Month, Massively by Joystiq (June 20, 2013, 4:30 PM), http://massively.joystiq.com/2013/06/20/ 
second-life-readies-for-10th-anniversary-celebrates-a-million-a.  
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“supplement their incomes . . . by working within [the] virtual world[].”64 
Linden Lab’s CEO, Philip Rosedale, has compared Second Life to a 
“developing nation” and stated that, “[i]f people cannot own property, 
the wheels of western capitalism can’t turn from the bottom.”65 But 
despite this bold analogy, Linden is only willing to go so far. Its end user 
license agreement makes players’ electronic belongings indescendible.66 
Accordingly, in the gaming realm, the line between virtual and real 
property has worn paper-thin. Nevertheless, noninheritability is the 
norm. And as I explain in Part I.C., a series of recent news items has cast 
a spotlight on decedents’ inability to transmit the contents of their e-mail 
and social media accounts. 
C. E-mails and Social Media 
Electronic information is a hallmark of our wired society. Without 
access to a decedent’s e-mail account, a personal representative often 
cannot marshal the estate’s assets and pay its debts.67 Similarly, social 
media has blossomed into a kind of living museum that continuously 
archives the present. However, many of these online assets die with their 
owners. 
Most e-mail service providers prohibit decedents from conveying 
the contents of their accounts. This fact came into sharp relief in 2004, 
when Justin Ellsworth, a twenty-year-old Marine, was killed by a roadside 
bomb in Iraq.68 Apparently, Justin had expressed a desire to make a 
scrapbook of the correspondence he had sent and received while overseas.69 
However, Yahoo! refused to grant his father access to his account, citing 
 
 64. Miriam A. Cherry, The Global Dimensions of Virtual Work, 54 St. Louis U. L.J. 471, 472 
(2010); see Quarmby, supra note 62, at 673 (“[U]sers have already made judicious use of their time in 
Second Life to become highly successful in-world entrepreneurs.”). 
 65. Steven J. Horowitz, Competing Lockean Claims to Virtual Property, 20 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 
443, 448 (2007). 
 66. See Terms of Service, Linden Lab, http://lindenlab.com/tos (last visited May 10, 2015) (“[Users] 
have no property, proprietary, intellectual property, ownership, economic, or monetary interest in 
[their] Account, [or] Linden Dollars . . . .”). Similarly, Eve Online, a space adventure game, boasts “a fully 
functioning economy, with regular trade of in-game currency and real money . . . .” Erik Kain, Massive 
“EVE Online” Battle Could Cost $300,000 In Real Money [Update], Forbes (Jan. 29, 2014, 4:55 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2014/01/29/massive-eve-online-battle-could-cost-500000-in-real-money. 
In one battle alone, players lost several hundred thousand dollars of virtual property. See id. Again, 
however, the game’s Terms of Service (“TOS”) make those assets indescendible. EVE End User 
License Agreement, EveOnline.com, http://community.eveonline.com/support/policies/eve-eula/ (last 
visited May 10, 2015) (“You have no interest in the value of your time spent playing the Game, for 
example, by the building up of the experience level of your character and the items your character 
accumulates during your time playing the Game.”). 
 67. See Gerry W. Beyer & Naomi Cahn, Digital Planning: The Future of Elder Law, 9 NAELA J. 
135, 13940 (2013) (discussing the importance of planning for the disposition of digital assets upon death). 
 68. See Justin Atwater, Who Owns E-Mail? Do You Have the Right to Decide the Disposition of 
Your Private Digital Life?, 2006 Utah L. Rev. 397, 400. 
 69. Id. 
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its terms of service (“TOS”), which declares that consumers have “[n]o 
[r]ight of [s]urvivorship” in their accounts, which “terminate upon . . . 
death.”70 Although a Michigan probate court ordered Yahoo! to disclose 
Justin’s e-mails, the ISP grudgingly complied while “promis[ing] to 
defend its commitment to treat user e-mails as private and confidential.”71 
Likewise, AOL, GMX, and Microsoft seem to mandate indescendibility, 
although their TOS are less clear.72 
In a small step in the opposite direction, Google recently introduced 
an Inactive Accounts Manager.73 This feature allows a user to name a 
“trusted contact” who will receive notice if the user has not logged on for 
a certain period of time.74 If the user chooses, the trusted contact can 
access the user’s messaging, blogging, Picasa, and YouTube accounts.75 
At the same time, though, Google admonishes individuals other than the 
trusted contact that only “in rare cases” will they be able to access a 
deceased user’s content.76 
Finally, Facebook’s descendibility practices have also sparked 
controversy.77 To commemorate its tenth anniversary, the Internet titan 
made special “look back” videos for its users consisting of images they had 
uploaded over the years.78 In a widely reported story from February 2014, 
 
 70. Id. at 400–01; Terms of Service, Yahoo!, https://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/terms (last 
updated Mar. 16, 2012) (“You agree that your Yahoo account is non-transferable and any rights to 
your Yahoo ID or contents within your account terminate upon your death. Upon receipt of a copy of 
a death certificate, your account may be terminated and all contents therein permanently deleted.”). 
 71. Atwater, supra note 68, at 401. 
 72. See, e.g., Terms of Service, AOL, http://legal.aol.com/terms-of-service/full-terms (last updated 
Sept. 15, 2014) (“Your username and account may be terminated if you do not sign on to a Service 
with your username at least once every 90 days. . . . After we terminate or deactivate your account for 
inactivity or any other reason, we have no obligation to retain, store, or provide you with any data, 
information, e-mail, or other content that you uploaded, stored, transferred, sent, mailed, received, 
forwarded, posted or otherwise provide to us . . . .”); General Terms and Conditions, GMX, 
http://www.gmx.com/company/terms/#.1559512-footer-nav1-3 (last visited May 10, 2015) (“GMX 
hereby grants, and you hereby accept, a nontransferable, revocable, non-sublicensable, and non-
exclusive license to use the GMX Software and all related documentation for your own personal or 
business use during the term of this Agreement.”); Microsoft Services Agreement, Microsoft 
Windows, http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/microsoft-services-agreement (last updated 
June 11, 2014) (“Microsoft doesn’t permit users to transfer their Microsoft accounts [and] . . . . [y]ou 
may not assign this Agreement or transfer any rights to use the Services.”).  
 73. See About Inactive Account Manager, Google, https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/ 
3036546?hl=en (last visited May 10, 2015). 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Accessing a Deceased Person’s Email, Google, https://support.google.com/mail/answer/ 
14300?hl=en (last visited May 10, 2015). 
 77. See generally Jason Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 1643 (2012) (discussing 
Facebook’s inheritability policies); Kristina Sherry, Comment, What Happens to Our Facebook Accounts 
When We Die?: Probate Versus Policy and the Fate of Social-Media Assets Postmortem, 40 Pepp. L. 
Rev. 185 (2012) (same). 
 78. See A Look Back, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/help/206982576163229 (last visited 
May 10, 2015). 
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a Missouri teenager named Jesse Berlin died unexpectedly, and his 
father, John, became fixated on seeing Jesse’s “look back” movie.79 
When John was unable to access Jesse’s account, he shrewdly decided to 
fight social media with social media and uploaded a tearful plea on 
YouTube begging Mark Zuckerberg to release Jesse’s video.80 John’s 
YouTube submission went viral, and Facebook soon announced that 
they would honor his request.81 Yet the company also made clear that 
they had created a special movie just for John—fashioned from publicly 
available content on Jesse’s page—and that they would not necessarily 
do the same thing for the families of other deceased consumers.82 
To summarize, the last two decades have seen the rise of electronic 
assets that occupy a hazy way station between property and contract. 
These parcels of fine print have real economic, social, and sentimental 
significance. Increasingly, though, they purport to be indescendible. In 
the next Part, I argue that courts should sometimes look beyond this label. 
II.  Challenging Contractual Indescendibility 
A consumer83 who wishes to transmit a contractually indescendible 
item must do three things. First, she has to prove that she has an 
ownership interest in the asset. Second, she needs to invalidate the 
noninheritability provision. And third, she will be forced to contend with 
federal law. This Part examines each step in this process. 
A. Ownership 
Decedents can only transfer what they own. It is unclear whether 
consumers possess this requisite interest in loyalty points and electronic 
assets. But in this Subpart, I argue that courts need not grapple with the 
 
 79. See Keith Wagstaff, Father “In Shock” Over Response to Facebook Plea, NBC News (Feb. 7, 2014, 
10:43 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/father-shock-over-response-facebook-plea-n24531. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See Brandon Griggs, Facebook Answers Grieving Dad’s Emotional Plea, CNN (Feb. 10, 2014, 
10:41 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/06/tech/social-media/facebook-dad-video-appeal. 
 82. See Paresh Dave, Grieving Dad Gets ‘Look Back’ Video for Dead Son From Facebook, L.A. 
Times (Feb. 7, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/07/nation/la-na-nn-facebook-dead-son-20140207. 
In the wake of the incident, Facebook announced that it was changing its “memorialization” policy. 
Previously, the company only allowed “friends” of a deceased user to view her account. See Facebook 
Changes Account Memorialization Policy, Fox News (Feb. 24, 2014, 7:39 AM), http://www.myfoxphilly.com/ 
story/24804786/facebook-changes-account-memorialization-policy. Now Facebook permits anyone to 
view a decedent’s publically shared information. See id. 
 83. Of course, many disputes over contractual indescendibility may arise after the customer has passed 
away. In that context, the consumer’s personal representative will step into her shoes and assert her rights. 
See, e.g., Horton, supra note 4, at 55758 (noting that contract-based claims generally survive the death of 
the plaintiff). As this Article was going to press, Facebook announced that it had amended its policies yet 
again, and would permit users to designate a “legacy contact” who would be able to manage a deceased 
user’s account. See What Is a Legacy Contact?, Facebook Help Center, https://www.facebook.com/help/ 
1568013990080948 (last visited May 10, 2015). 
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blunt and binary matter of whether something is property. Instead, they 
should ask a narrower question: is an item descendible? The answer 
should revolve around whether customers have reason to believe that 
they enjoy the privilege of posthumous conveyance. 
The status of an item as either “property” or “not property” has 
been a tempting shortcut for courts and lawmakers grappling with “pure” 
descendibility issues.84 For instance, in the 1950s, states began to recognize 
publicity rights, which protect individuals from the unauthorized use of 
their name, voice, or image.85 At first, publicity rights were seen as an 
offshoot of privacy rights, but gradually they came to be understood as a 
species of property.86 This conceptual shift had an important doctrinal 
corollary; as courts soon recognized, if publicity rights were property 
rights, then they were inheritable.87 In addition, this “property syllogism”88 
can cut the other way. For instance, human body parts boast tremendous 
financial value.89 Despite the facts that there is a dire kidney shortage90 
and that blood, hair, sperm, and eggs are freely alienable during life,91 
cadaveric tissue is indescendible.92 This result stems, in part, from the fact 
that judges have decreed that organic material “forms no part of the 
property of [the] estate.”93 
Similar issues are now swirling around contractual indescendibility. 
This discussion has taken place in the shadow of F. Gregory Lastowka 
and Dan Hunter’s forward-looking 2004 article, The Law of the Virtual 
 
 84. See id. at 55657, 56162. 
 85. See, e.g., Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 86. See David Westfall & David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 Cardozo Arts & 
Ent. L.J. 71, 8189 (2005). 
 87. See id. at 8489. 
 88. Id. at 74 (coining the phrase “property syllogism”). 
 89. See Michele Goodwin, Black Markets: The Supply and Demand of Body Parts 178 (2006) 
(estimating that the average human body is worth over $220,000). 
 90. See Michele Goodwin, Private Ordering and Intimate Spaces: Why the Ability to Negotiate is 
Non-Negotiable, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1367, 1370 (2007). 
 91. See Elizabeth E. Appel Blue, Redefining Stewardship Over Body Parts, 21 J.L. & Health 75, 79 (2008). 
 92. See Horton, supra note 4, at 55257. 
 93. Estate of Jimenez, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 710, 714 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting O’Donnell v. Slack, 
55 P. 906, 907 (Cal. 1899)); cf. Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877, 880 (Colo. 1994) 
(“Clearly, there can be no property right in a dead body . . . .”). In addition, a second (albeit less 
prominent) reason for making cadaveric tissue indescendible is to avoid the commodification of the 
human body. See Horton, supra note 4, at 554–57. This rationale is the driving force behind the related 
rule that organs are market inalienable. See National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) 
(2015) (forbidding the acquisition or transfer of “any human organ for valuable consideration”); National 
Organ Transplant Act: Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways 
& Means, 98th Cong. 26 (1984) (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman) (“Human organs should not be 
treated like fenders in an auto junkyard.”); Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 16, 8A U.L.A. 156 (2006) 
(criminalizing the sale of human tissues); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 
1849, 1879–81 (1987). 
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Worlds.94 Lastowka and Hunter began by noting that some virtual assets 
mimic brick-and-mortar possessions by being rivalrous, persistent, and 
valuable.95 For instance, purchasing a plot of “land” in the Sims Online 
entitles a player to develop it, exclude others, and sell it.96 Lastowka and 
Hunter then examined whether recognizing virtual ownership would 
dovetail with three leading normative accounts of property rights. First, 
Lastowka and Hunter analyzed utilitarianism, which they described as 
the idea that “we should grant private property interests if doing so 
would increase . . . social welfare.”97 They argued that the fact that 
“millions of people labor to create objects of value in virtual worlds,” 
revealed that the benefits of acknowledging digital property outweighed 
the costs.98 Second, Lastowka and Hunter examined John Locke’s labor-
desert thesis. Locke famously posited that “[w]hatsoever [man] removes 
out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he has mixed his 
labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes 
it his property.”99 Here, too, Lastowka and Hunter found that the scales 
tipped toward carving out virtual rights, noting that users sink monumental 
amounts of time and energy into earning online items.100 Finally, Lastowka 
and Hunter viewed electronic possessions through the prism of Hegelian 
personality theory.101 As amplified by contemporary writers like Margaret 
Jane (Peggy) Radin, this strand of the private law canon suggests that the 
law should protect cherished things such as a longtime home or a 
wedding ring.102 Noting that people often feel as though their avatar is an 
extension of their self, Lastowka and Hunter again concluded that there 
should be no distinction between virtual property and its real-world 
counterpart.103 
Although Lastowka and Hunter broke new ground, I have 
reservations about their approach. For one, it can be indeterminate. 
Consider the question of whether frequent flyers own their miles. Lastowka 
 
 94. F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1 
(2004). In roughly similar fashion, intellectual property scholars have discussed the normative implications 
of honoring contractual provisions deeming transfers of software to be licenses (rather than sales). See, 
e.g., John P. Uetz, The Same Song and Dance: F.B.T. Productions, LLC v. Aftermath Records and the 
Role of Licenses in the Digital Age of Copyright Law, 57 Vill. L. Rev. 177, 191 (2012). 
 95. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 94, at 30. 
 96. See id. at 3031. In an influential article published a year later, Joshua Fairfield amplified this point 
with respect to a broader range of digital assets, including “internet resources” such as “URLs, domain 
names, [and] email accounts.” Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 1047, 1052 (2005). 
 97. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 94, at 44. 
 98. See id. at 45. 
 99. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government 17 (Thomas P. Peardon ed. 1952) (1690). 
 100. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 94, at 46. 
 101. See id. at 48–49.  
 102. See id.; see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 959 
(1982) (“Most people possess certain objects they feel are almost part of themselves.”). 
 103. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 94, at 48. 
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and Hunter would start with utilitarianism, by asking whether society 
would be better off if loyalty points belonged to customers. However, it is 
unclear how a court or a legislature would make that decision. Lastowka 
and Hunter imply that a pivotal factor should be whether an item is popular, 
noting that a “societal good is composed simply of aggregate individual 
goods.”104 But this is a logical leap. The fact that many consumers derive 
pleasure from an asset does not mean that broadening their control over 
it would maximize their collective satisfaction. To the contrary, giving 
customers an equity stake might decrease production. Indeed, firms would 
be less likely to create rewards schemes if they were thrust into the role of 
custodian for millions of accountholders.105 Compounding this uncertainty, 
different panels in the Lastowka and Hunter triptych can point in opposite 
directions. For example, if the utilitarian score for frequent flyer miles was 
high, the personality rating of such a fungible asset might be much lower. 
Even the most intuitive aspect of Lastowka and Hunter’s framework—
Lockean labor-desert—proves difficult to apply. To be sure, there is a 
visceral appeal to tying ownership to the tedium of hours spent at 30,000 
feet or the brain flash of the Second Life entrepreneur. However, it is not 
clear why these individuals’ Lockean claim would trump the sponsoring 
company’s rival Lockean claim. For instance, in the context of video 
games, Stephen Horowitz has argued that Lastowka and Hunter give 
short shrift to developers: 
In most worlds, users do not “produce” the products they claim as 
property; they earn them through battles with virtual beasts or 
purchase them through trade with virtual shopkeepers. Such goods are 
created through the labor of the operators before users take control of 
them. When operators labor to produce virtual products, the operators 
have a greater initial labor-based claim to ownership of such products.106 
And in any event, labor-desert is an especially poor fit for inheritance law. 
Locke’s signature insight might explain why the first person who generates 
an asset through hard work acquires the right to bequeath it or transmit 
it via intestacy. But it cannot explain why the next generation—people 
who may have never earned a loyalty point or clutched a joystick—also 
deserve the same courtesy.107 
 
 104. Id. at 45. 
 105. See Christopher J. Cifrino, Virtual Property, Virtual Rights: Why Contract Law, Not Property 
Law, Must Be the Governing Paradigm in the Law of Virtual Worlds, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 235, 25758 (2014). 
 106. Horowitz, supra note 65, at 453; see also Westbrook, supra note 56, at 79394 (“[T]here is a 
clear outlay of labor, time and money on the part of both parties.”). 
 107. See Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Property 396 (1990) (“[T]he labor-desert principle can 
support at most a one-time power of gift or bequest.”). But see Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, 
A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 Ind. L.J. 1, 7 n.22 (1992) (asking whether “by creating 
property through labor, the owner has a natural right not only to bequeath to her beneficiary but also 
to bequeath the power to bequeath”). 
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Finally, giving customers industrial strength property rights would 
raise ponderous questions. Would firms need to compensate their clientele 
every time they amended their rewards programs, or their servers crashed, 
or they abandoned a virtual world?108 Could creditors attach a frequent 
flyer’s account or a gamer’s avatar? What about jilted spouses in divorce 
proceedings? These dilemmas illustrate why it is counterproductive to 
force courts and lawmakers to make the black-and-white choice between 
“property” and “not property.” 
A better solution would examine each arrow in the quiver of 
property rights individually. For the purposes of this Article, the critical 
inquiry is whether customers reasonably think that they have the right to 
control an asset after death. Of course, one might respond that no consumer 
could hold such a belief about an asset that is marked “not property” or 
“indescendible.” But to my mind, that objection puts the trailer before 
the tractor. The fine print (and a customer’s potential knowledge of it) 
relates to the next issue—whether the rights-stripping clause is valid—and 
not the threshold matter of whether an asset is descendible. Instead, at this 
preliminary stage, where we are merely trying to allocate the badges of 
ownership, it makes more sense to focus on extra-contractual factors, such as 
the drafter’s conduct. For instance, the fact that a company allowed an item 
to be transferred during life could be evidence that it should be descendible. 
The basic idea here is that subject to some exceptions, “inheritability and 
alienability . . . ‘go hand in hand.’”109 Thus, a frequent flyer, gamer, or 
Internet user could justifiably assume that she possesses the power of 
posthumous transmission over an asset she can sell or give away. 
Seen through this lens, many of the items I have discussed would be 
descendible. Electronic assets in worlds like Second Life would be a 
particularly easy case. Indeed, Linden has encouraged real world sales of 
virtual products and proclaimed that players hold “property rights” in 
their inventions.110 Similarly, users can freely share e-mails and social 
media uploads. Because these things practically belong to an individual 
during life, there is no reason to exclude them from her estate. 
Rewards points would be slightly more fraught. As noted, many 
airlines, hotels, and car rental agencies allow customers to trade miles or 
their equivalent.111 However, they also charge fees and impose limits on 
these transactions.112 Moreover, miles can expire, which seems inconsistent 
 
 108. Cf. Cifrino, supra note 105, at 25758 (listing various ways in which developers could face 
liability if lawmakers carved out virtual property rights for gamers). 
 109. Horton, supra note 4, at 576 (quoting Micheletti v. Moidel, 32 P.2d 266, 267 (Colo. 1934)). 
 110. See supra text accompanying notes 6165. 
 111. See supra text accompanying notes 3739. 
 112. See Transferring Miles and Points, InsideFlyer, http://www.insideflyer.com/articles/ 
article.php?key=6373 (last visited May 10, 2015). 
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with the idea that they truly belong to travelers.113 Given these restrictions, 
perhaps it would not be plausible for members to think that their points 
are descendible. 
But then again, more than any other intangible asset, points have 
blossomed into a quasi-currency. Consumers can earn them and redeem 
them almost like cash.114 In addition, members perceive their points to be 
a form of wealth. As one commentator remarked, “[e]arning frequent 
flyer miles in the minds of most people is akin to earning money and the 
idea that your miles . . . would simply disappear when you die strikes a 
profoundly disturbing note.”115 Similarly, in some circumstances, the 
receipt of loyalty credits triggers the dark side of ownership: taxation. In 
August 2014, the Tax Court held in Shankar v. Commissioner that the 
petitioner should have reported the 500 Citibank “thank you” points he 
collected for opening his account and used to purchase an airline ticket.116 
The court characterized the credits as “something given in exchange for 
the use (deposit) of [petitioner’s] money; i.e., something in the nature of 
interest.”117 Thus, customers could easily think that miles—the functional 
equivalent of “money” and “interest”—are descendible. 
A final set of complications arise from companies that impose strict 
nontransferability policies only to ignore them. A prime example is 
Blizzard, which has endured years of criticism for tolerating under-the-
table sales of WoW goods.118 Although there is a paucity of authority, at 
least one decision suggests that a company’s actual practices are more 
probative than its stance on paper. In In re Platt, a bankruptcy case, the 
Boston Red Sox argued that a nonconveyance clause in a subscription 
agreement elucidated that season tickets were not the debtor’s property.119 
The judge disagreed, citing the franchise’s “pattern of arbitrarily and even 
capriciously permitting transfers” to find that the debtor held “property 
right[s]” in the seats.120 Courts should reach the same conclusion when 
asked to declare that a firm’s sporadic enforcement of its nontransferability 
provision justifies a consumer’s impressions that an item is inheritable. 
 
 113. See, e.g., Airline Miles Expiration Policies Roundup, Points Guy (Apr. 17, 2013), 
http://thepointsguy.com/2013/04/airline-miles-expiration-policies-roundup. 
 114. See supra text accompanying notes 3739. 
 115. Delta Skymiles Now Die When You Do, Flynaija (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.flynaija.com/ 
delta-skymiles-now-die-when-you-do.  
 116. 143 T.C. No. 5 (2014). 
 117. Id. at 13. On the other hand, the IRS has promised not to assert that frequent flyer miles are 
taxable if they are “attributable to the taxpayer’s business or official travel.” Kelly Phillips Erb, Tax 
Court Sides With IRS In Tax Treatment Of Frequent Flyer Miles Issued By Citibank, Forbes (Aug. 28, 
2014, 8:35 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2014/08/28/tax-court-sides-with-irs-in-tax-
treatment-of-frequent-flyer-miles-issued-by-citibank. 
 118. See supra text accompanying notes 5659. Similarly, carriers such as Virgin purport to ban the 
transfer of miles, but make exceptions on a “case-by-case basis.” Stoller, supra note 1. 
 119. 292 B.R. 12, 17 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2003). 
 120. Id. 
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Accordingly, judges need not begin their contractual indescendibility 
analysis with the cartoonish question of whether an item is a consumer’s 
property. Instead, they should ask whether a firm has led customers to 
believe that an asset is descendible. But as I discuss next, even if a 
consumer prevails on this issue, she must also convince the court not to 
enforce the noninheritability clause. 
B. Validity 
Customers may challenge indescendibility provisions on three grounds. 
First, they may argue that they never assented to the clause. Second, they 
can invoke the unconscionability defense. And third, if a drafter adds an 
indescendibility provision to an existing contract, customers might claim 
that the unilateral revision violates the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. This Subpart evaluates these theories. 
1. Lack of Assent 
Because virtually all indescendibility provisions appear in agreements 
that are consummated online, they occupy an unsettled area of contract 
law. Courts once decided whether users assented to Internet agreements 
by applying a formalistic rubric that divided those contracts into two 
camps. On the one hand, there were clickwraps, boxes full of text that 
prompt a user to select “I agree.”121 Judges favored this species of e-
agreement, reasoning that the customer’s click was the digital equivalent 
of a signature or a handshake.122 On the other hand, courts were less 
sanguine about browsewraps, in which drafters simply posted provisions 
on a website and declared that visitors had accepted them.123 Browsewraps 
were valid only if the user had actual or constructive notice of the terms.124 
Beginning about three years ago, judges began to recognize a third 
kind of online deal, “modified clickwrap” (or “multi-wrap”).125 These 
web pages feature a hyperlink to the TOS near the button that a user must 
press to complete the transaction. Thus, like browsewraps, the contract’s 
provisions are not immediately apparent; however, as with clickwraps, 
 
 121. See, e.g., United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 462 n.22 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 122. See, e.g., Segal v. Amazon.com, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2011); TradeComet.com 
LLC v. Google, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 370, 37778 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. 
Supp. 2d 229, 237 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Person v. Google Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 488, 49697 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); 
Novak v. Overture Servs., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 
91 Minn. L. Rev. 459, 466 (2006). 
 123. See, e.g., Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 124. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Comms. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 31 (2d Cir. 2002); Zaltz v. JDATE, 
952 F. Supp. 2d 439, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Motise v. America Online, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 2d 563, 56465 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 125. See Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 904, 911 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (using the 
phrase “modified clickwrap”); Nancy S. Kim, Wrap Contracts: Foundations And Ramifications 6364 
(2013) (referring both to “modified clickwrap[s]” and “multi-wraps”). 
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the consumer must actually do something—press, “I agree”—to indicate 
her assent.126 
For instance, in Fteja v. Facebook, Inc.,127 the Southern District of 
New York struggled with whether to enforce a forum-selection clause in 
Facebook’s TOS.128 To open an account, customers must click a button 
that says “Sign Up,” which appears next to a hyperlink to the TOS.129 The 
court noted that this arrangement was like a browsewrap in the way that 
the TOS were not visible, but also like a clickwrap because it tasked the 
user with actively indicating assent.130 Relying on the fact that the plaintiff 
was Internet savvy, the court held that he had agreed to the TOS: 
The mechanics of the internet surely remain unfamiliar, even obtuse to 
many people. But it is not too much to expect that an internet user whose 
social networking was so prolific that losing Facebook access allegedly 
caused him mental anguish would understand that the hyperlinked 
phrase “Terms of Use” is really a sign that says “Click Here for Terms 
of Use.” . . . Here, [the plaintiff] was informed of the consequences of 
his assenting click and he was shown, immediately below, where to 
click to understand those consequences. That was enough.131 
Two similar cases have gone the other way, however. In Nguyen v. 
Barnes & Noble Inc.,132 the Ninth Circuit declined to enforce an online 
retailer’s arbitration clause.133 Barnes & Noble’s TOS is accessible through a 
hyperlink that appears near the button that a shopper must push to 
complete a purchase.134 Nevertheless, the appellate panel held that the 
plaintiff had neither actual nor constructive notice of the provisions: 
[W]here a website makes its terms of use available via a conspicuous 
hyperlink on every page of the website but otherwise provides no 
notice to users nor prompts them to take any affirmative action to 
demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the hyperlink to relevant 
buttons users must click on—without more—is insufficient to give rise 
to constructive notice. . . . Given the breadth of the range of technological 
savvy of online purchasers, consumers cannot be expected to ferret out 
 
 126. See, e.g., Vernon v. Qwest Comms. Int’l, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 114950 (D. Colo. 2012) aff’d, 
925 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (D. Colo. 2013) (describing these “hybrid arrangements”). 
 127. 841 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 128. See id. at 83538. 
 129. See id. at 83435. 
 130. See id. at 83637. 
 131. Id. at 83940; see also Swift, 805 F. Supp. 2d at 912 (deeming a consumer to be bound because 
she “was provided with an opportunity to review the terms of service in the form of a hyperlink immediately 
under the ‘I accept’ button”). 
 132. 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 133. See id. at 117778. 
 134. See id. at 1177. Admittedly, the appellate panel characterized the TOS as browsewrap, and 
never employed the phrases “modified clickwrap” or “multi-wrap.” See id. at 1176. Yet from the 
court’s own description, it is clear that the Barnes & Noble TOS possess the hallmarks of such an 
agreement, a “‘Terms of Use’ link [that] appears either directly below the relevant button a user must 
click on to proceed in the checkout process or just a few inches away.” Id. at 1178. 
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hyperlinks to terms and conditions to which they have no reason to 
suspect they will be bound.135 
Even more to the point, in Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc.,136 a Massachusetts 
appellate court refused to honor a forum-selection clause in a dispute over 
the descendibility of an e-mail account.137 The plaintiffs, co-administrators 
for their deceased brother John’s estate, sought a declaratory judgment 
that John’s electronic correspondence belonged to his estate.138 A 
probate judge invoked the portion of Yahoo!’s TOS that requires 
customers to pursue claims in California.139 When the plaintiffs appealed, 
Yahoo! defended the order below by asserting that John could not have 
created his account without “expressly manifest[ing] assent” to the TOS 
(presumably by pressing a button to create his account).140 The reviewing 
court reversed, reasoning that Yahoo! had failed to prove that John (or 
other plaintiffs) had either seen the TOS or agreed to them by “clicking 
‘I accept’ or by taking some similar action.”141 
Notably, many contractual indescendibility clauses appear in modified 
clickwraps. For instance, to become an AAdvantage142 or SkyMiles143 
member, to partake in WoW144 or Second Life,145 or to open a Yahoo!146 
 
 135. Id. at 117879. 
 136. 987 N.E.2d 604 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013). 
 137. See id. at 61213. 
 138. See id. at 609. 
 139. See id. at 610. 
 140. Brief for Defendant-Appellee Yahoo! Inc. at 28, Ajemian, 987 N.E.2d 604 (No. 2012-P-0178). 
I say “presumably” because Yahoo’s briefs were a little coy about what exactly John needed to do to 
christen the service. Compare id. at 3 (asserting without further explanation that “[i]n order to create 
the account, John Ajemian (like all Yahoo! users) agreed to Yahoo!’s Terms of Service”), with id. at 
28 (claiming that “[t]he account could not have been successfully created if the user had not agreed to 
accept the terms prior to submitting the registration data to Yahoo!”). As I discuss infra note 146, 
Yahoo’s current TOS is a modified clickwrap. 
 141. Ajemian, 987 N.E.2d at 61213. 
 142. To join AAdvantage, a traveler must check a box that says, “I agree to the Terms and Conditions of 
the AAdvantage program.” Join AAdvantage Program, Am. Airlines, https://www.aa.com/AAdvantage/ 
quickEnroll.do (last visited May 10, 2015). The phrase “Terms and Conditions” is in underlined blue 
text, indicating that it is a hyperlink to the actual contract. Id. Similarly, every time members log in to 
their account, they must press a button marked “Login” that appears just below the phrase “[b]y 
logging into my AAdvantage account, I hereby accept the Terms and Conditions of the AAdvantage 
program.” AAdvantage, Am. Airlines, https://www.aa.com/AAdvantage/aadvantageHomeAccess.do (last 
visited May 10, 2015). Again, “Terms and Conditions” is a hyperlink. Id. Nevertheless, the website 
never forces the user to trudge through the actual contract. 
 143. Similarly, Delta’s SkyMiles membership application requires users to click “I agree to the 
terms and conditions,” but confusingly has a hyperlink to “membership guide & program rules.” 
SkyMiles, Delta, https://www.delta.com/profile/enrolllanding.action (last visited May 10, 2015). 
 144. See Sign Up, World of Warcraft, https://us.battle.net/account/creation/wow/signup (last 
visited May 10, 2015). 
 145. See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 603 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 146. See Sign Up, Yahoo!, https://edit.yahoo.com/registration?_done=http%3A%2F%2Fmail. 
yahoo.com&fsredirect=1&fs=x4wNmgeHafCyitdC_YmaQ5qn3e07XVj8yY9EKt5KHoc8Yc2ei2QYqF
9iOcTi5738q2S1Xhi0 (last visited May 10, 2015). 
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or Google account,147 one must check a box next to a statement that 
announces one’s acquiescence to the TOS. Yet to find the actual meat of 
the contract, one must migrate to a different webpage via a hyperlink.148 To 
be sure, as in Fteja, a drafter might be able bridge this gap between apparent 
and actual agreement by proving that a consumer was sophisticated. 
Then again, that may be a tough row to hoe in the indescendibility context, 
where the star witness will often be deceased. Thus, at least until companies 
redesign their websites, their indescendibility provisions may not be 
binding.149 
2. Unconscionability 
Consumers can also claim that noninheritability provisions are 
unconscionable.150 Over the past two decades, this notoriously amorphous 
rule has become the weapon of choice against unfair terms in adhesion 
contracts.151 First, the term must be procedurally unconscionable, which 
usually means that it has been offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis by a 
party with superior bargaining muscle, or buried in fine print.152 Most 
noninheritability clauses fit both criteria. Indeed, they are created by 
powerful firms as part of a standardized template and secreted on web 
pages that most users will never see.153 For example, in Bragg v. Linden 
Research, Inc.,154 a Pennsylvania district court applying California law 
considered whether to enforce an arbitration clause in Second Life’s 
TOS.155 The plaintiff had sued Linden for “unlawfully confiscat[ing] his 
virtual property and den[ying] him access to their virtual world.”156 
Despite the fact that the plaintiff was an attorney and an avid gamer, the 
 
 147. Create Your Google Account, Google, https://accounts.google.com/SignUp (last visited May 10, 2015). 
 148. See supra notes 135140. 
 149. Admittedly, some firms will not have this problem. For example, United Airlines’ 
MileagePlus site is a standard clickwrap that displays the text of the TOS above the “I agree” button. 
See MileagePlus Enrollment, United Airlines, http://www.united.com/web/en-US/apps/account/enroll.aspx 
(last visited May 10, 2015). 
 150. Complicating matters, some of these agreements also contain choice-of-law clauses. See, e.g., 
General AAdvantage Terms and Conditions, Am. Airlines, http://www.aa.com/i18n/AAdvantage/ 
programInformation/termsConditions.jsp#general-aadvantage-program-conditions (last visited May 10, 
2015) (“These terms and conditions are governed by and to be interpreted in accordance with the laws 
of the State of Texas.”). As a result, there may be preliminary skirmish over whether the chosen state’s 
law violates a strong public policy of the jurisdiction where the consumer has sued. See, e.g., David Horton, 
Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism, and State Public Policy, 101 Geo. L.J. 1217, 123637 
(2013) (discussing similar litigation in the context of challenges to the validity of arbitration clauses). 
 151. See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—the Emperor’s New Clause, 
115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1967) (articulating the now well-known two-part test for unconscionability). 
 152. Courts sometimes refer to the drafter’s market power as “oppression” and the term’s physical 
appearance as “surprise.” See, e.g., A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 120 (Ct. App. 1982). 
 153. See supra notes 146152. 
 154. 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 155. See id. at 60607. 
 156. Id. at 595. 
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court held that the dispute resolution provision was procedurally 
unconscionable because it was nonnegotiable and inconspicuous.157 
Some cases also predicate procedural unconscionability on an 
adherent showing that she lacked “a meaningful choice of reasonably 
available alternative sources of supply from which to obtain the desired 
goods and services free of the terms claimed to be unconscionable.”158 
This additional “market alternatives” element is a crude attempt to 
implement the insights of the law and economics movement of the 1970s 
and 1980s. Scholars such as Alan Schwartz, Louis Wilde, and George 
Priest argued that companies in competitive industries must pass their 
savings from “unfair” provisions back to consumers.159 If this is true, then 
“one-sided” terms may not be “one-sided” at all. Indeed, it is entirely 
possible that adherents would rather surrender certain liberties and pay 
less for an item than retain their rights and spend more.160 In theory, the 
market alternatives rule identifies sectors in which the lockstep use of a 
particular clause makes it impossible for consumers to shop for their 
preferred combination of term “harshness” and price.161 
Nevertheless, this extra doctrinal component will probably not save 
indescendibility provisions from being procedurally unconscionable. As 
noted above, frequent fliers, gamers, and social media users have little 
choice but to accept such a clause.162 Moreover, there is no true parallel 
for distinctive universes such as WoW or services such as Facebook. 
Perhaps the one niche in which consumers have a choice is e-mail. As 
noted, indescendibility is the norm, with the exception of Google.163 But 
even Google has stopped short of recognizing unfettered inheritability. 
Although trusted contacts can obtain the contents of a user’s account, 
 
 157. Id. at 60607. 
 158. Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 797, 807 (Ct. App. 2005). But see Gatton 
v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 35556 (Ct. App. 2007) (rejecting the additional “market 
alternatives” requirement). 
 159. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect 
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630 (1979); Alan Schwartz & Louis 
L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and 
Security Interests, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1387 (1983); Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive 
Unconscionability, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1053 (1977); George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product 
Warranty, 90 Yale L.J. 1297 (1981). 
 160. See Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, supra note 159, at 1072 
& n.38. 
 161. One flaw with the market alternatives rule is that the widespread use of a particular term can 
actually cut the other way. Indeed, the fact that most drafters in a competitive market employ a provision 
suggests that the provision strikes the ideal balance between “harshness” and price. See, e.g., David Horton, 
Mass Arbitration and Democratic Legitimacy, 85 U. Colo. L. Rev. 459, 476 (2014) (book review). In 
addition, as Russell Korobkin has argued, consumers will only be able to exert pressure on drafters to 
offer efficient “salient” terms. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203, 123439 (2003). 
 162. See supra text accompanying notes 4348, 6175. 
 163. See supra text accompanying notes 7679. 
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other individuals, including a decedent’s personal representative, may 
not be so lucky.164 Accordingly, even in the eyes of judges who insist on 
market alternatives, most indescendibility clauses will probably be 
procedurally unconscionable. 
Unfortunately, substantive unconscionability is harder to predict. 
Contract provisions are substantively unconscionable if they are unfair, 
one-sided, or “unreasonably favorable” to the drafter.165 Is it “harsh” to 
eliminate the power to bequeath an item or pass it through intestacy? The 
bulk of the substantive unconscionability case law deals with arbitration 
clauses,166 which are difficult to analogize to indescendibility provisions. 
However, the importance of the right surrendered bolsters the case for 
undue unfairness. People feel very strongly about their ability to transmit 
property to their loved ones after they die.167 After all, it “has been part 
of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times.”168 Being stripped 
of that prerogative is no small thing. 
Another aspect of the substantive unconscionability calculus is 
whether a suspect term has a “reasonable justification . . . based on 
‘business realities.’”169 As I have discussed elsewhere, one rationale for 
“pure” indescendibility is avoiding administrative costs.170 The idea here 
is that not all property transitions seamlessly from the dead to the living. 
For example, if body parts were inheritable, personal representatives 
would need to spend time and money preserving the decedent’s tissues.171 
Some companies’ explanations for their indescendibility policies are 
roughly similar. For instance, airlines claim that they have limited 
frequent flyer rights so that they “no longer ha[ve] to devote resources to 
the transfer process.”172 Yet this is a transparent fig leaf. As noted, many 
carriers allow members to swap miles while alive.173 The firms that do 
permit the posthumous conveyance of intangible assets only require a 
photocopy of the decedent’s death certificate and a letter from her 
personal representative.174 These burdens are no worse than opening or 
 
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 77–80; see also Submit a Request Regarding a Deceased 
User’s Account, Google, https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/2842525?hl=en&ref_topic=3075532 
(last visited May 10, 2015) (“Any decision to [provide the contents of a deceased user’s account] will 
be made only after a careful review.”). 
 165. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 166. See David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 387 (2012). 
 167. See Lewis M. Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand 21 (1955) (“[T]he desire to dispose 
of property by will is very general, and very strong.”). 
 168. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987). 
 169. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 692 (Cal. 2000). 
 170. See Horton, supra note 4, at 58688, 59496. 
 171. See id. at 58688. 
 172. Delta Skymiles Now Die When You Do, supra note 115. 
 173. See supra notes 3941. 
 174. See Chelsea Emery, Don’t Let Frequent Flyer Miles Die With You, Reuters, Mar. 1, 2013, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/01/us-inheritance-airmiles-idUSBRE9200I420130301. 
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closing an account. Accordingly, when noninheritability provisions seem 
like little more than a raw exercise of drafting power, they should be 
substantively unconscionable. 
Alternatively, in the e-mail and social media context, some ISPs and 
commentators have claimed that indescendibility protects customers’ 
privacy.175 In this era of online banking, perhaps deeming a decedent’s 
logon information or password to be inheritable would raise the specter 
of identity theft.176 In addition, permitting personal representatives to 
rummage through a decedent’s online accounts might create a risk of 
embarrassing content falling into the wrong hands. Justin Atwater lucidly 
describes this concern: 
Imagine a typical teenager who shares the most intimate details of her 
life with her closest friends through instant and text messaging. If she 
dies intestate, should her parents be allowed to view the details of her 
personal text messages on the basis that the messages should pass 
through intestacy in the same manner as other property? What if, 
instead, she married and later died testate, devising the residue of her 
estate to her spouse without mentioning the e-mail account. Should her 
spouse be granted access to the intimate details of her life before they 
were married on the basis that the messages are part of her residual 
estate?177 
Yet the privacy argument is not fully compelling. For one, it does 
not apply to decedents who have expressly attempted to bequeath their 
digital assets. Indeed, those individuals have decided for themselves that 
the advantages of descendibility outweigh the dangers. Moreover, I 
doubt that noninheritability is the appropriate default even for people 
who died intestate or with estate plans that do not mention their online 
accounts. The specter of embezzlement or discovery of salacious 
information is not unique to the Internet. To the contrary, it exists any 
time a personal representative steps into a decedent’s shoes and begins 
sorting through her diaries, old letters, and safe deposit boxes.178 Thus, it 
is not clear that ISPs should be able to justify noninheritability provisions 
on this ground.179 
 
But see Banta, supra note 4, at 83536 (proposing that companies recoup the expense of complying 
with decedents’ or beneficiaries’ wishes by imposing transfer fees). 
 175. See, e.g., Rebecca G. Cummings, The Case Against Access to Decedents’ E-Mail: Password 
Protection As an Exercise of the Right to Destroy, 15 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 897, 90607 (2014); Lilian 
Edwards & Edina Harbinja, Protecting Post-Mortem Privacy: Reconsidering the Privacy Interests of the 
Deceased in A Digital World, 32 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 83, 8587 (2013). 
 176. See, e.g., Molly Wilkens, Note, Privacy and Security During Life, Access After Death: Are 
They Mutually Exclusive?, 62 Hastings L.J. 1037, 104852 (2011). 
 177. Atwater, supra note 68, at 404. 
 178. See Cahn, supra note 17, at 1716 (“While there is always the potential that even an executor or 
administrator could misappropriate [online] information, this risk is present in the administration of tangible 
assets as well as digital ones, and state fiduciary law is designed to guard against just such misuse.”). 
 179. For another jaundiced take on the privacy rationale, see Banta, supra note 4, at 83740 
(noting that some of the same IPS that claim to be safeguarding privacy are facing lawsuits for sharing 
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3. Violation of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Finally, a company’s attempt to add an indescendibility clause to 
existing agreements may violate the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. Contracts often contain change-of-terms provisions, which 
empower drafters to modify their arrangements with consumers.180 In the 
seminal case of Badie v. Bank of America,181 a commercial lender sent “bill-
stuffers” to its checking and credit card customers informing them that 
the terms of the contract had changed and they were now obligated to 
arbitrate any dispute.182 A California appellate court held that the bank’s 
gambit was in bad faith.183 As the judges explained, because the initial 
agreements said nothing about dispute resolution, the bank improperly 
sought to inject “an entirely new term which ha[d] no bearing on any 
subject, issue, right, or obligation addressed in the original contract.”184 
Similar maneuvers with indescendiblity provisions may meet the same 
fate. Delta’s efforts are illustrative. To be sure, the airline “reserve[s] the 
right to change program rules, benefits, [and] regulations, . . . at any time 
without notice.”185 Yet nothing in the carrier’s previous SkyMiles 
agreement speaks to the issue of inheritability. Although its contract 
prohibits “[s]ale or [b]arter,” these sections relate to exchanges for 
consideration, not gratuitous transfers.186 Arguably, because the original 
deal does not address bequests and intestacy, the new indescendibility 
clause is too jarring a departure to be valid. 
Accordingly, there are strong arguments that noninheritability 
provisions should not be binding. Nevertheless, as I explain next, companies 
do not create rewards points and digital assets on a blank slate. Instead, a 
maze of federal regulation governs this area. 
C. Federal Law 
This Subpart discusses the federal dimensions of contractual 
indescendibility. It shows that the ADA may preclude frequent flyers 
from striking down noninheritability clauses. It then evaluates whether 
the SCA precludes ISPs from releasing a decedent’s electronic assets to 
her personal representative. 
 
customer data); Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Who Owns A Decedent’s E-Mails: 
Inheritable Probate Assets or Property of the Network?, 10 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 281, 31314 
(2007) (noting that most privacy-related claims expire upon death). 
 180. See, e.g., David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 
UCLA L. Rev. 605, 60809 (2010). 
 181. 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct. App. 1992). 
 182. See id. at 27677. 
 183. See id. at 28384. 
 184. Id. at 284. 
 185. Delta Membership Guide & Program Rules, Delta, http://www.delta.com/content/www/en_US/ 
skymiles/about-skymiles/program-rules-conditions.html (last updated Mar. 1, 2015). 
 186. Id. 
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1. The Airline Deregulation Act 
Congress passed the ADA in 1978 to promote “efficiency, innovation, 
and low prices” in the airline industry through “maximum reliance on 
competitive market forces.”187 The statute provides that “a State . . . may 
not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force 
and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier . . . .”188 
In a trilogy of cases, the Supreme Court determined that the ADA 
preempts an array of state law claims. 
First, in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,189 the National 
Association of Attorneys General had issued Air Travel Industry 
Enforcement Guidelines (“NAAG Guidelines”).190 This phalanx of rules, 
made obligatory through state consumer protection statutes, required 
carriers to be forthright about any restrictions in their advertising and 
frequent flyer program solicitations.191 The Court first examined the 
scope of the ADA preemption clause, which bars state regulation 
“related to” an airline “price, route, or services.”192 The Court determined 
that this phrase sweeps broadly, and means “having a connection with or 
reference to” airline operations.193 Gauged by this yardstick, the Court 
found that the fare advertising portions of the NAAG Guidelines were 
impermissibly entangled with airline “rates.” For one, they “establish[ed] 
binding requirements as to how tickets may be marketed if they are to be 
sold at given prices.”194 In addition, because there is a tight link between 
marketing practices and costs in an industry, “state restrictions on fare 
advertising have the forbidden significant effect upon fares.”195 Thus, the 
Court held that the ADA eclipsed the NAAG Guidelines. 
Two years later, in American Airlines v. Wolens, the Court offered a 
more fine-grained reading of the statute.196 A class of AAdvantage 
members asserted that the carrier’s retroactive changes to its frequent 
flyer policies violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and constituted a 
breach of contract.197 The Court began by parsing the text of the ADA’s 
preemption clause. The Court noted that this provision contains two 
elements: it forbids states from (1) affecting “rates, routes, or services” 
by (2) “enact[ing] or enforc[ing] any law.”198 The Court explained that 
 
 187. 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(6), (a)(12)(A) (2015). 
 188. Id. § 41713(b)(1). 
 189. 504 U.S. 374 (1992). 
 190. Id. at 37980. 
 191. Id. at 38788. 
 192. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 193. Morales, 504 U.S. at 38384. 
 194. Id. at 388. 
 195. Id. 
 196. 513 U.S. 219 (1995). 
 197. Id. at 22425. 
 198. Id. at 226. 
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both the consumer protection and breach of contract claims met the first 
component: they pertained to “‘rates,’ i.e., American’s charges in the 
form of mileage credits for free tickets and upgrades, and to ‘services,’ 
i.e., access to flights and class-of-service upgrades.”199 However, the 
Court found the second prong more complicated. According to the 
Court, the Consumer Fraud Act was undoubtedly an example of a state 
“enact[ing] or enforc[ing]” law: after all, it was an Illinois statute.200 Yet 
the same could not be said for the breach of contract allegations. Indeed, 
the Court reasoned, the breach of contract claims did not arise from an 
external mandate imposed by the jurisdiction, but rather sought redress 
for “the airline’s alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings.”201 
Therefore, the ADA only preempted the consumer protection claims. 
This distinction between state-mandated and voluntarily assumed 
duties was front and center in the Court’s 2014 decision in Northwest, Inc. v. 
Ginsberg.202 Northwest’s WorldPerks terms and conditions gave it sole 
discretion to disqualify customers for abusing the program.203 Northwest 
had used this dominion to revoke the membership of Minnesota resident 
Rabbi S. Binyomin Ginsberg, who then sued, alleging that the carrier had 
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.204 Specifically, 
Ginsberg alleged that Northwest had terminated his account in an 
attempt to cut costs by slashing its WorldPerks roster.205 It was unclear 
how to classify this claim under Wolens. On the one hand, the implied 
covenant vindicates extrinsic state policies by superimposing “community 
standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.”206 Thus, it would seem 
to be preempted. On the other hand, the doctrine merely enforces the 
true terms of the contract. Because it forbids self-serving conduct to 
effectuate the parties’ “justified expectations,”207 it also seemed analogous 
to the non-preempted breach of contract claim in Wolens. 
Nevertheless, the Court unanimously held that Minnesota’s version 
of the implied covenant was “a state-imposed obligation,” in contravention 
of the ADA.208 The Court reached this conclusion for one reason in 
particular: because “under Minnesota law parties cannot contract out of 
the covenant.”209 The Court opined that the mandatory nature of the rule 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 22728. 
 201. Id. at 228. 
 202. 134 S. Ct. 1422 (2014). 
 203. Ginsberg v. Nw., Inc., 653 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 204. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1426. 
 205. Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
Thereof at *7, Ginsberg v. Nw., Inc., No. 09-CV-28 JLS NLS, 2009 WL 9523735 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2009).  
 206. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a (1981). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1432. 
 209. Id. 
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confirmed that it was a creation of the state rather than “an attempt to 
vindicate the parties’ implicit understanding of the contract.”210 Yet the 
Court stressed the limited scope of its ruling, highlighting that the ADA 
does not eclipse all implied covenant claims: 
[P]etitioners exhort us to go further and hold that all such claims, no 
matter the content of the law of the relevant jurisdiction, are pre-
empted. If pre-emption depends on state law, petitioners warn, airlines 
will be faced with a baffling patchwork of rules, and the deregulatory 
aim of the ADA will be frustrated. But the airlines have means to 
avoid such a result. A State’s implied covenant rules will escape pre-
emption only if the law of the relevant State permits an airline to 
contract around those rules in its frequent flyer program agreement, 
and if an airline’s agreement is governed by the law of such a State, the 
airline can specify that the agreement does not incorporate the 
covenant.211 
But this is faux modesty. Ginsberg’s supposed limiting principle—
that the ADA does not eclipse versions of the implied covenant that 
parties can “contract around”—might as well exempt unicorns or flying 
pigs. I am not aware of any state that permits parties to expressly 
sanction bad faith conduct.212 Thus, the decision encourages airlines to 
mimic Delta and unilaterally amend their frequent flyer terms to make 
miles indescendible. Moreover, Ginsberg sounds the death knell for 
unconscionability challenges to indescendibility provisions in frequent 
flyer agreements. Although the opinion does not mention the doctrine, 
the case’s briefing and oral argument cast unconscionability as a 
boogeyman, the paradigmatic example of a state law that “seek[s] to 
 
 210. Id. As an alternative basis for his holding, Justice Alito also noted that Minnesota did not 
read the covenant into all contracts, but rather exempted employment contracts for “policy reasons.” 
Id. Accordingly, he observed that “the decision not to exempt other types of contracts must be based 
on a policy determination, namely, that the ‘policy reasons’ that support the rule for employment contracts 
do not apply (at least with the same force) in other contexts.” Id. 
 211. Id. at 1433. 
 212. Of course, drafters can displace the implied covenant by spelling out their performance 
obligations in detail rather than using open-ended terms such as “sole discretion.” Thus, some cases 
have referred to the covenant as a “gap-filling default rule,” rather than a mandatory principle, because it 
“comes into play when a question is not resolved by the terms of the contract or when one party has 
the power to make a discretionary decision without defined standards.” Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC 
v. Tropic Enters., Inc., 966 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet 
the Court’s requirement that the covenant be “waivable” demands that a state enforce a provision that 
says something like “the implied covenant shall not apply to this agreement.” Indeed, during oral 
argument, Justice Alito, who wrote the opinion, conceptualized the issue that way: 
JUSTICE ALITO: Well, let me ask you this. Suppose you have in Minnesota or one of the 
States where you say the covenant is simply a way of effectuating the intent of the parties, 
you have a contract between two very tough and nasty businessmen. And they write right in 
their contract, you know, we’re going to comply with the literal terms of this contract, but 
we do not promise each other that we’re going to proceed in good faith or that we are going 
to deal with each other fairly. We are going to take every advantage we can under the literal 
terms of the contract. Now, would that get rid of the covenant under Minnesota law? 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422 (No. 12-462).  
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enlarge the parties’ bargain” to effectuate policies “external to the 
agreement.”213 Thus, the ADA seems to deny frequent flyers the two 
most potent means to attack noninheritability provisions. 
There are three caveats to this gloomy conclusion. First, as noted 
above, some airlines may not be able to prove that frequent flyers have 
assented to their TOS.214 The Court strongly implied that Ginsberg’s 
complaint would not have been preempted if it was rooted in a state rule 
that sought “to effectuate the intentions of parties or to protect their 
reasonable expectations.”215 Principles of offer and acceptance do 
precisely that: they determine the existence and scope of “obligation[s] . . . 
that the parties voluntarily undertook.”216 Thus, the ADA should not 
prevent courts from finding that a consumer never agreed to an 
indescendibility provision. 
A second slender ray of light stems from the evolution of loyalty 
points. As I have discussed, members now earn most of their miles 
through tie-ins and credit card purchases rather than travel.217 Because 
the ADA only preempts state law that impacts “a price, route, or 
service,”218 a plaintiff who has earned her credits on the ground might be 
able escape the statute’s gravitational pull. In fact, Ginsberg left the door 
ajar for such a case, noting that the plaintiff “did not assert that he 
earned his miles from any activity but taking flights or that he attempted 
to redeem miles for anything but tickets and upgrades.”219 And once a 
case falls outside of the ADA’s ambit, nothing prevents a court from 
deeming an indescendibility provision to be unconscionable or a bad 
faith unilateral amendment. 
A third potential limit flows from untangling various strands of the 
implied covenant. Recall that Ginsberg faulted Northwest for exercising 
its discretionary right to terminate his SkyMiles membership for the 
purpose of reducing its overhead.220 The gravamen of such a claim is that 
the airline did something it had the express right to do for an improper 
reason. As such, it could easily be conceptualized as seeking to enforce a 
free-floating, policy-driven obligation to perform contractual duties fairly. 
 
 213. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 11, Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422 (No. 12-462); see also Brief for 
Steven J. Burton, Professor of Law, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 13, Ginsberg, 134 
S. Ct. 1422 (No. 12-462) (containing an entire section entitled “The Implied Covenant is Not Like the 
Unconscionability Doctrine”); Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 212, at 21 (“MR. YELLIN: . . . 
[D]octrines [like] unconscionability . . . impose extracontractual limitations on the parties’ choices.”). 
 214. See supra text accompanying notes 146152. 
 215. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1431 (quoting Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common 
Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 369, 371 (1980)). 
 216. Id. 
 217. See supra text accompanying notes 3536. 
 218. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2015). 
 219. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1431. 
 220. See supra text accompanying notes 208209. 
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Conversely, a Badie-style challenge to a unilateral amendment bears 
specifically on the question of what the parties’ bargain is.221 Indeed, it 
attempts to stop the drafter from expanding the contract beyond its 
original scope. Thus, rather than merely trying to stamp out self-serving 
conduct, a consumer who seeks to overturn a carrier’s ex post addition of 
an indescendibility provision is arguing “I did not agree to that.” Perhaps 
this difference could prompt a future court to distinguish Ginsberg. 
Nevertheless, in many contexts, the ADA creates a force field 
around indecendibility provisions in frequent flyer agreements. And as I 
explain next, ISPs have made a similar argument with respect to the 
inheritability of e-mails and other digital media. 
2. The Stored Communications Act 
In 1986, Congress passed the SCA to extend privacy protections to 
information stored on computer servers.222 ISPs claim that this antediluvian 
federal statute prevents them from sharing a decedent’s electronic 
communications with her personal representative. In this Subpart, I 
critique that argument. In addition, because several jurisdictions and the 
Uniform Law Commission have recently approved legislation that covers 
similar terrain, I briefly discuss the uncharted issue of SCA preemption. 
Some firms contend that the SCA bars them from releasing a 
decedent’s online accounts. They cite § 2702 of the statute, which 
imposes civil penalties upon ISPs that offer services to the public223 and 
“knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a 
communication while in electronic storage by that service.”224 This 
prohibition is not absolute, § 2702 exempts users who have given their 
“lawful consent” to disclosure.225 Yet it is unclear what “lawful consent” 
 
 221. See Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct. App. 1998); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 185190. 
 222. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, H.R. 4952, 99th Cong. (1986); Orin S. 
Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and A Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 
72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1208, 1213 (2004). For specific discussions of the relationship between federal 
and state law in this area, see Cahn, supra note 17, at 170618; James D. Lamm et al., The Digital 
Death Conundrum: How Federal and State Laws Prevent Fiduciaries From Managing Digital Property, 68 
U. Miami L. Rev. 385, 40306 (2014); Sandi S. Varnado, Your Digital Footprint Left Behind at Death: An 
Illustration of Technology Leaving the Law Behind, 74 La. L. Rev. 719, 750 (2014); Matt Borden, 
Comment, Covering Your Digital Assets: Why the Stored Communications Act Stands in the Way of 
Digital Inheritance, 75 Ohio St. L.J. 405, 41117 (2014). 
 223. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)–(2) (2015); see also Andersen Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 
1041, 1042–43 (N.D. Ill. 1998). This limitation means that most work-related or educational e-mail 
accounts do not fall within § 2702. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 17, at 1734 n.33. 
 224. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1); see also id. § 2707 (listing the damages for violation of the statute). In 
addition to § 2702, trustees, executors, and administrators must contend with § 2701 of the SCA and the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 (CFAA). Id. § 1030. These provisions forbid unauthorized access to 
e-mail accounts. For reasons that I have articulated elsewhere, and will not repeat here, I do not believe that 
these statutes apply to fiduciaries. See Horton, supra note 17, at 173234. 
 225. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3). 
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means. Moreover, even when the “lawful consent” exception has been 
met, the SCA merely allows but does not require ISPs to allow access to 
a decedent’s accounts.226 Thus, Facebook has opposed a personal 
representative’s request for a decedent’s files on the twin grounds that 
“[i]t is unclear whether an administrator may lawfully consent to disclosure 
of a deceased user’s communications” and that “disclosures under the 
SCA are voluntary, not mandatory.”227 Likewise, Yahoo! has argued that 
“there is no exception to the SCA’s prohibition on disclosure of 
‘contents’ for an administrator.”228 
These arguments are only partially persuasive. Upon close inspection, 
the scope of the SCA depends more on an ISP’s TOS than any other 
factor. Consider decedents who either die intestate or do not mention 
digital assets in their will or trust. The statute’s legislative history reveals 
that these individuals can give “lawful consent” by signing up with an ISP 
that authorizes disclosure: 
If conditions governing disclosure or use are spelled out in the rules of 
an electronic communication service, and those rules are available to 
users or in contracts for the provision of such services, it would be 
appropriate to imply consent on the part of a user to disclosures or uses 
consistent with those rules.229 
The fact that TOS can serve as the springboard for “lawful consent” 
belies ISPs’ claims that they are constrained by § 2702. If they truly 
wanted to make their customers’ electronic media inheritable, they could 
easily accomplish that goal. 
Similarly, TOS loom large even when a decedent addresses digital 
assets in her estate plan. Suppose someone creates a will or a trust that 
attempts to devise the contents of her online accounts, but her ISP’s TOS 
contains an indescendibility provision. Arguably, the testator or settlor’s 
directive is not “lawful consent” under § 2702. To be sure, she has 
“consented” to release her data. But because her conduct defies the fine 
print, it may not be “lawful.”230 And in any event, throwing off the 
shackles of § 2702 only goes so far. As mentioned, the statute is a one-
way street, if it governs, ISPs cannot disclose, but if it does not govern, 
 
 226. If a user satisfies the “lawful consent” element, the ISP “may divulge the contents of a 
communication.” Id. § 2702(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
 227. Facebook, Inc.’s Motion to Quash Subpoena in a Civil Case at 6:4, 3:1415, In re Request for 
Order Requiring Facebook, Inc. to Produce Documents and Things, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1204 (N.D. Cal. 
2012) (No. 5:12-mc-80171-LHK (PSG)). 
 228. Brief for Defendant-Appellee Yahoo! Inc. at 41 n.18, Ajemian v. Yahoo! Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (No. 2012-P-0178). 
 229. H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 66 (1986). 
 230. Compare Benderson Dev. Co. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 998 F.2d 959, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“To 
breach a contract is not unlawful; the breach only begets a remedy in law or in equity.”), with Coats v. 
Dish Network, L.L.C., 303 P.3d 147, 150 (Colo. App. 2013) (“The plain and ordinary meaning of 
‘lawful’ is that which is ‘permitted by law.’” (citation omitted)). 
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ISPs can still choose not to disclose.231 Once again, the company’s 
descendibility policy is king. 
The SCA’s impact on digital inheritance has led to a flurry of state 
level reforms. Delaware,232 Connecticut,233 Indiana,234 Oklahoma,235 and 
Rhode Island236 have all sought to regulate this nexus between technology 
and death. Some of these statutes clarify that decedents “lawful[ly] consent” 
to have their personal representative handle their digital assets,237 although 
others are more equivocal.238 In addition, they create a process by which 
personal representatives who are entitled to obtain the contents of a 
decedent’s electronic accounts can send a written demand to the ISP 
along with a death certificate, a probate court order, or a testamentary 
instrument.239 And finally, they require ISPs to comply with such a 
request.240 
In addition to these state laws, in July 2014, the Uniform Law 
Commission approved the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets 
Act (“UFADAA”).241 This draft statute allows fiduciaries to access the 
contents of a decedent’s e-mail account “if the [ISP] is permitted to 
 
 231. See supra text accompanying note 204. 
 232. See Del. Code tit. 12, § 5005(a)(b) (2015). 
 233. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-334a (2015). 
 234. Ind. Code § 29-1-13-1.1 (2015). 
 235. Okla. Stat. tit. 58, § 269 (2015). 
 236. R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-27-3 (2015). 
 237. See, e.g., Del. Code tit. 12, § 5005(a); cf. Okla. Stat. tit. 58, § 269 (“The executor or administrator 
of an estate shall have the power, where otherwise authorized, to take control of, conduct, continue, or 
terminate any accounts of a deceased person on any social networking website, any microblogging or 
short message service website or any e-mail service websites.”). 
 238. Two states’ laws declare that they do not “require [an ISP] to disclose any information . . . in 
violation of any applicable federal law.” Ind. Code § 29-1-13-1.1(d)(1); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§ 45a-334a(c) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to require an electronic mail service provider 
to disclose any information in violation of any applicable federal law.”). By making themselves 
subservient to the SCA, these statutes cannot be an independent grounds for finding “lawful consent”; 
rather, they merely apply whenever § 2702 does not apply. There are also a few idiosyncratic state 
laws. For instance, Nevada only allows personal representatives to “direct the termination of any account 
of the decedent,” not to transmit an account in accordance with the decedent’s wishes. Nev. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 143.188 (West 2015). Likewise, Virginia has a detailed law governing digital inheritance, but it 
only covers “deceased minors.” Va. Code § 64.2-110 (2015). 
 239. See Del. Code tit. 12, § 5005(c)(d); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-334a(b); Ind. Code § 29-1-13-1.1(b); 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-27-3(1)(2). 
 240. See supra note 239. Several of these statutes contain cryptic references that could be construed 
to allow a will, trust, or TOS to prohibit disclosure. For example, Delaware mandates release of the 
contents of a decedent’s account “[u]nless otherwise provided by a governing instrument,” whatever 
that means. Del. Code tit. 12, § 5005(b) (emphasis added). Similarly, Oklahoma’s statute applies only 
if disclosure is “otherwise authorized.” Okla. Stat. tit. 58, § 269. 
 241. Press Release, Uniform Law Commission, Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act 
Approved (July 16, 2014), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/NewsDetail.aspx?title=Uniform% 
20Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets%20Act%20Approved. 
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disclose” those materials under § 2702.242 Thus, unlike the SCA’s regime 
of permissive release, the UFADAA requires ISPs to divulge stored data 
when a fiduciary has the decedent’s blessing.243 Finally, the UFADAA 
also contains a safety valve for privacy-conscious testators by allowing 
them to declare in their wills that they want to prohibit access to their 
electronic possessions.244 
These new and budding laws raise thorny federalism issues. To be 
sure, the SCA neither contains an express preemption provision nor 
evidences lawmakers’ intent to occupy the field.245 However, implied 
preemption may be a different story. As is well-known, state legislation 
must yield if it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”246 Unfortunately, there 
is tension between some state digital asset statutes and the SCA’s chief 
goals. As noted, the SCA aims to preserve the privacy of electronic 
communications.247 This is not an idle concern: many people would 
shudder at the thought of others rummaging through their online 
correspondence.248 For this reason, the SCA embraces a default rule of 
nondisclosure. Indeed, when both the user and an ISP’s TOS are silent, 
§ 2702 kicks in.249 Conversely, some jurisdictions make e-mails 
presumptively descendible.250 Because this approach has the potential to 
 
 242. See Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act § 4 (2014), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2014_UF
ADAA_Final.pdf [hereinafter UFADAA]. 
 243. See id. § 8. 
 244. See id. § 4 (giving fiduciaries authority over digital property “[u]nless otherwise provided 
. . . in the will of a decedent”). 
 245. The SCA contains language that seems, at first blush, to expressly preempt state law. Section 
2708 states that “[t]he remedies and sanctions described in this chapter are the only judicial remedies 
and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter.” 18 U.S.C. § 2708 (2015). Thus, in Quon 
v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d on other 
grounds, 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir 2008), rev’d sub. nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010), a 
California district court relied on this passage to hold that the SCA preempted state law invasion of 
privacy claims against a police department for disclosing text messages. However, subsequent courts 
have interpreted § 2708 not to be a preemption provision, but simply to clarify that the SCA does not 
contain a Fourth Amendment-style exclusionary rule that can be invoked against the government. See 
Bansal v. Russ, 513 F. Supp. 2d 264, 282 (E.D. Pa. 2007); In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecom. Records 
Litig., 483 F. Supp. 2d 934, 939 (N.D. Cal. 2007). In any event, the question of whether the SCA 
precludes plaintiffs from asserting claims under state invasion of privacy laws has little bearing on 
whether the statute forbids states from regulating the posthumous transmission of digital assets. 
 246. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (quoting Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 247. See supra text accompanying note 200. 
 248. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 17, at 1738; Edwards & Harbinja, supra note 175, at 117 (“More 
than ever before, ‘ordinary people,’ leave digital relics which may be highly personal and intimate, and 
are increasingly preserved and accessible in large volume after death.”). 
 249. See supra text accompanying notes 236238. 
 250. See, e.g., Del. Code tit. 12, § 5005(c)(d) (2015); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 33-27-3(1)(2) (2015). 
Other state laws (and the UFADAA) go out of their way to avoid a conflict with the SCA. See supra 
note 245 and text accompanying note 249. 
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expose decedents to unwanted publicity, it is especially vulnerable to 
implied obstacle preemption. 
On the other hand, there is one context in which courts should 
recognize that local law can trump the federal statute. Recall that the 
SCA privileges an ISP’s indescendibility provision over a decedent’s 
unambiguous attempt to convey her digital assets in her estate plan.251 
This aspect of the statute does not further Congress’s ambition of 
shielding consumers from prying eyes. To the contrary, honoring the 
noninheritability clause thwarts the decedent’s wish to share her electronic 
media with her friends and family. Because this component of the SCA is 
not necessary to effectuate the core congressional blueprint, state 
legislatures should have the power to override it. And indeed, as noted 
above, some have done so by deeming a bequest of digital assets to be 
“lawful consent” to disclosure under § 2702.252 In addition, statutes such 
as the UFADAA, which have been carefully tailored to avoid contradicting 
the SCA, can go further. They can elevate a decedent’s express 
command in her testamentary instruments to where it belongs: above the 
sheer boilerplate that is a noninheritability provision. 
Conclusion 
Fine print has a new trick. Companies are encumbering property-
esque entitlements such as frequent flier miles and virtual assets with 
indescendibility provisions. I have argued that courts should not always 
defer to these contractually mandated life estates. First, some consumers 
may reasonably believe that they have the right to convey these things to 
their loved ones after death. Second, noninheritability clauses can lack 
assent or violate principles of unconscionability or good faith and fair 
dealing. And third, although federal law does create safe harbor for some 
such terms, it does not immunize them all. We should not allow fine print 
to swallow what the Supreme Court has called “one of the most essential 
sticks in the bundle of rights.”253 
 
 251. See supra text accompanying notes 237–238. 
 252. See, e.g., Del. Code tit. 12, § 5005(a); Okla. Stat. tit. 58, § 269 (2015); R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-
27-3(1)(2). 
 253. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 
164, 176 (1979)). 
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